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Playful Design Manifesto 
for Creative Blockchain 
Eco-systems
Bronwin Patrickson and Michael Pierre Johnson
Abstract. What does game design theory offer for efforts to recon-
figure social value exchange using emerging blockchain technologies 
in Scotland’s Creative Industries? Blockchain eco-systems are plat-
form co-operatives that combine digital networking systems with 
blockchain peer-to-peer authentication technologies. While digital 
networks such as these can successfully co-ordinate self-interest for 
mutual benefit they are not by their nature public services and need 
to be designed accordingly in order to help manage their societal 
impact, while also promoting their public benefits. In this chapter, 
we present a manifesto for the application of game design princi-
ples within blockchain eco-systems for social value transformation. 
As we argue, game design strategies can help to manage tensions 
between creativity and sustainability, individual versus collective 
concerns, and quantified versus priceless values. Such speculative 
opportunities for playful co-operation are considered here within 
the context of Scotland’s creative collectives. The unique contribu-
tion of this study is to develop a preliminary exploration for the 
playful engineering of crypto-based co-operative economies.
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1.  Introduction
Blockchain is an emerging, peer-to-peer value transfer technology 
currently being employed in finance remittance work and also sup-
ply chain management. This consensus technology uses a shared 
database system to check the accuracy of each transaction against a 
collection of identical ledgers. Such a facility for secure peer-to-peer 
trade has many potential applications. In this study, we focus on the 
ways that it is being used to help manage co-operative enterprise 
within what are known as blockchain eco-systems. That is, systems 
that combine digital networking capacities with peer-to-peer value 
exchange and authentication technologies to create platform co-
operatives (networked, co-operative enterprises).
Cross-sectoral collaboration is a fundamentally different 
approach to the more traditional, competitive business culture. For 
example, a bold, but ultimately fraught collective experiment to pool 
and store modern art works for later resale in order to re-distribute 
the sales income between members known as The Artist’s Pension 
Trust, is now struggling to regain the trust of members after contro-
versies regarding the introduction of storage fees by subsequent com-
mercial partners (Jones, 2018). Managing a large crowd of competing 
interests may well be as challenging as learning a new language.
Blockchain ecosystems “of different stakeholders and their 
 interactions with each other, the system and the outside world” (The 
Blockchain Ecosystem, 2017) often employ mediated reputation 
 systems (such as reviews from buyers and sellers, or endorsements) 
and identity verification processes (Roio and Jelincic, 2017) to help 
govern peer-to-peer interactions between strangers. While these 
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foundational frameworks promote accountability, they still do not 
guarantee a co-operative eco-system among potential collaborators. 
Reputation driven systems can support peer-to-peer exchange prac-
tice, but transforming the values underpinning that practice and 
encouraging a more open and collaborative cross-sectoral approach 
is likely to require more substantial change.
This challenge is further complicated by efforts to drive social 
value transformation through the use of digital tokens. In a block-
chain eco-system, members generally exchange digital tokens in lieu 
of money. Digital tokens might represent anything that can be 
exchanged as a type of currency. Examples of digital tokens include 
votes, or measures of local trading capacity, or any other form of 
agreed value that members can trade as part of their participation 
within this eco-system. These sorts of digital tokens can be earnt dur-
ing nominated events such as volunteering, or information exchange 
and their value will change according to the design of each system. As 
an example, certain types of value might only accrue at certain loca-
tions, or when nominated conditions are met, such as eco-friendly 
production, or when multiple parties are conducting trades at varying 
times, or over time and in infinitely large and small amounts.
The flexible capacity to link potentially transformative values to 
digital token transactions can support targeted social enrichment 
programmes, but it also requires a concerted collective effort. In 
Scotland at present, for example, Glasgow based artist Ailie 
Rutherford along with designer and researcher Bettina Nissen, 
together with the people of Glasgow’s diverse Govanhill community 
are exploring how a crypto-currency might be designed to help sup-
port a feminist social agenda. Their hope is that by capturing and 
rewarding womens’ traditional work, so often under-valued by cur-
rent socio-economic systems, a digital cryptocurrency can help to 
promote “the diversity and richness of local communities as a form 
of wealth” (Cheng, 2017). Through a series of community crypto-
knitting workshops and discussion groups, Rutherford and Nissen 
are asking the community, “How do we make sure current gender, 
race and class biases aren’t coded into the currency of the future so 
it’s more fair and equal?” (Riddoch, 2018).
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These are valuable questions and among the challenges that we 
will also consider in this chapter. Our research study begins with a 
more detailed review of the challenges of creative cluster manage-
ment within Scotland, followed by a discussion of eight key princi-
ples for gamified blockchain eco-system design identified during this 
research project. We conclude our manifesto by considering ways 
that these design principles can be applied to the specific challenges 
of blockchain eco-systems within the Scottish context.
1.1.  Blockchain eco-system initiatives  
in the Scottish context
The Scottish creative sector is dynamic and innovative, incorporating 
such diverse industries as music, theatre, game production, comics, 
data technologies, media, design, craft, publishing, and the arts. 
Centered in urban and regional clusters, Scottish creative practitio-
ners often work independently, or in small, flexible, and sometimes 
dispersed groups that can struggle with limited research and devel-
opment capabilities (R&D) (Riddoch, 2018). Nevertheless, block-
chain themed knowledge exchange events occur regularly in all three 
urban centers and the number of public enterprise and corporate 
data-sharing initiatives are growing each year. Given that Scotland is 
characterized by 99.4% small to medium sized enterprise activity 
(Scottish Governmnet, 2017) there is significant research interest in 
the ways that consensus blockchain technologies might be applied to 
support the networked capacity of creative cluster initiatives. In the 
2018 Scottish Digital Design Futures Report (Patrickson, 2018), for 
example, it was suggested that blockchain inspired data sharing 
technologies like Corda create the opportunity to build a collective 
data-bank compiled from the scraped, collated, and analyzed digital 
production histories that creative practitioners generate across soft-
ware packages. In order to supplement existing knowledge exchange 
networks and potentially inform future practice this hypothetical 
collective data bank could be accessed and shared via a platform co-
operative, or blockchain eco-system.
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Responding to that speculative design for a cross-sectoral, prac-
titioner led digital data-sharing venture this article explores how a 
gamified design approach might help digital production communi-
ties achieve such a level of collaboration.
1.2.  Platform co-operation as creative practice: 
Creating a positive networked experience  
for Scotland’s creative collective  
communities
Creative engagement can help to shape reflective individuals, pro-
duce engaged citizens, create interventions to broker divisions, sup-
port healthier and more balanced communities, improve health, 
well-being, and “operate as part of a complex ecology of talent, 
finance, content and ideas” (Stern and Seifert, 2016; Scotland, 
2016).
As such, we welcome Creative Scotland’s Creative Industries 
Strategy (Scotland, 2016), which attempts to acknowledge the social 
and cultural impact of creative industries in addition to its eco-
nomic impact. Cultural Enterprise, in their Performance and Impact 
2014–15 report, position Scotland’s creative economy as a growing 
sector “dominated by sole-practitioners, micro-businesses and small 
companies” (Office, 2015; Jones, 2018). However, the risks involved 
in start-up formation for creative practitioners is often high, with 
many small creative companies failing early in their formation. For 
creative practitioners, there is a skills gap in connecting entrepre-
neurial activities, whether socially driven or commercially driven, 
with the needs of their developing practice. The UK Creative 
Industries Strategy (Government, 2018) focuses on business expan-
sion in the creative industries, rather than stabilizing the transition 
from  creative learner to creative practitioner. This serves London’s 
saturated and competitive creative sector but does little to support 
Scotland’s  context of a more fractured creative industries.
The creative economy has taken on growing significance in the 
UK, including Scotland, partly in response to the recent economic 
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recession and a slow, austerity-laden recovery, while recognizing the 
increasing complexity and potential of new technologies, service 
innovation, ubiquity of digital production and consumption, and the 
innovative business models sweeping away previous incumbents. 
Such disruption has influenced working practices across all sectors 
to a point where innovation is the normative aspirational mode of 
operation. This demand for continuous innovation has cast the 
 creative industries in a stark light as playing a vital role in providing 
sustainable innovation and growth.
These recent demands from and for the creative industries have 
inspired the growing interest and research in the development of 
varying forms of creative collectives, clusters, hubs, or other organiz-
ing models of creative practice. Collectives have existed for many 
centuries, even millennia, particularly through various artist com-
munities with shared needs, resources, aesthetics, or even politics. 
Their potential as organizational models across wider disciplinary 
contexts has taken on growing significance; whereas creative clusters 
and hubs have emerged as a strategic approach for public funding to 
stimulate and support the creative economy.
Nesta’s 2014 manifesto (NESTA, 2014) acknowledges the sys-
tematic support that local policymakers are giving to creative clus-
ters: Investing in people, buildings, and anchor institutions in order 
to “raise visibility and strengthen networks.” This has most recently 
culminated in the Creative Industries Clusters Programme, led by the 
Arts and Humanities Research Council and funded through 
the Industrial Strategy Challenge Fund. The programme is an ambi-
tious research and development investment strategy to establish up 
to eight Creative R&D Partnerships within existing creative clusters 
across the UK. To delegate the strategic investment and growth of 
creative clusters to local policymakers is both encouraging and a 
potential oversight, as there is a significant gap in knowledge about 
how creative networks emerge and become established.
In a similar vein, funding invested in new “creative hubs,” as 
places of creative collaborative working, can fall short of their 
intended impact by not effectively engaging and serving the interests 
of local creative communities. Partly in response to this, the British 
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Council commissioned and published the Creative HubKit (Council, 
2015), to promote best practice for creative hubs, while acknowledg-
ing the diversity of models and challenges such hubs need to over-
come. These models cover studios, large building centers, dispersed 
networks, clusters, online platforms as well as alternative models 
(Council, 2015; Scottish Governmnet, 2017). The recommendations 
of the HubKit sets out seven key milestones: from “defining the 
vision” and “designing the network,” to “communicating strengths 
and impacts” and “sustaining and scaling” (Council, 2015; Scotland, 
2016). As a result, this paper acknowledges the pragmatic 
 recommendations for creative hubs, based on key milestones, as a 
strong format to be extended into wider co-operative contexts in 
Scotland.
Creative Scotland funded recent research on the future of collec-
tives (Creative_Scotland, 2015), which sought to cultivate collective 
working and support the development of creative entrepreneurial 
talent. It aligned with Creative Scotland’s strategic intention to 
 support talent hubs for creative practitioners and identified recent 
initiatives “that reinforced the importance of scale, networking, 
 collaboration and the notion of creative places around the country 
to support creative industries” (Creative_Scotland, 2015); NESTA, 
2014). Through design-led participatory workshops, the research 
brought together artists and designer-makers from “new and 
 emerging collectives by enabling them to clarify their operat-
ing  models,” ‘share their experiences’ and “collaboratively iden-
tify […] guiding principles to support the development of collective 
organisational structures” (Creative_Scotland, 2015; Scottish 
Governmnet, 2017).
This research project articulated a “no one-size-fits-all approach” 
to the emergence and development of creative collectives (Creative_
Scotland, 2015; Ostrom, 1990), while providing insights into under-
standing collective ways of working with regard to their business 
models, support required, and the significance of networks and place 
(Creative_Scotland, 2015, pp. 41–43) report’s recommendations 
 promote the creation of a “Collective of Collectives,” develop-
ing “an online visual map of collectives across Scotland,” “create 
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online guidance for setting up and developing a collective” and the 
“cocreation of online and offline resources to support collectives 
across Scotland” (Creative_Scotland 2015, pp. 41–45). The project 
provides strong argument for the ways that collectives benefit their 
communities of artists and designer-makers and calls for pragmatic 
steps to help consolidate this development practice.
2.  Gamification: A Blockchain Eco-system 
Design Manifesto
Gamification is “the use of game design elements in non-game con-
texts” (Deterding et al., 2011); Government, 2018) such as work, 
education, and healthcare. It is now well-documented that games 
can motivate participatory engagement using a network of struc-
tured goals, challenges, and rewards Deterding, 2012; Hamari et al., 
2014). For example, popular video games like Pokémon (Tajiri, 
1996) and its more recent mobile version Pokémon Go (Niantic, 
2016) motivated hundreds of millions of players to take to the 
streets, turning urban areas into a type of public social event space. 
Inspired by this sort of impact, gamification has been widely 
embraced as a type of generative social practice.
The design of gamified social practice can be approached in 
many different ways however. At its most socially conscious, gami-
fication can be a humanist design approach that aims to enrich 
people’s lives with play (McGonigal, 2011). At its most profit 
focused, gamification has been criticized as superficial “exploitation-
ware” (Bogost, 2011) and “pointification” (Robertson, 2010); a 
manipulative practice linked to corporate compliance strategies that 
instrumentalize play in the form of points, badges, and leaderboards 
in order to maximize profits. This latter approach has previously 
been characterized by a focus upon competency goals, scaffolded by 
clear achievement recognition pathways. However, a more generally 
playful approach can be equally engaging. Examples include the 
playful Bogota Mayor who transformed local driving cultures by 
hiring mimes to help pedestrians cross the street and mimic 
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aggressive drivers (Deterding, 2014, pp. 311–312). This humorous 
campaign helped to halve the number of road fatalities. In other 
words, gamification is not simply about games.
In this research project, the decision to explore a gamified 
response to blockchain eco-system design takes inspiration from 
Deterding’s (Deterding, 2018) argument that a more integral, play-
ful, and humanist approach towards gamification is possible. This 
alternative may be more challenging, but ultimately offers the 
greatest potential to transform daily life. In the context of block-
chain eco-systems, design influences stem from many sources: 
 co-operative game-design theory, as well as research from a large 
number of sharing networks and commons resource management 
projects, including social and economic ideas of what functioning 
collaborative communities could be (Jenkins and Ito, 2015)and 
how they might best be able to achieve innovation goals and social 
change agendas. Historic political economy research has also pro-
vided an important reference. Elinor Ostrom’s (Ostrom, 1990) 
seminal design principles for effective commons resource manage-
ment have been particularly influential (clear group boundaries, 
tiered management structures balanced by equal access to rule 
modification and systems for effective dispute resolution, internal 
monitoring, combined with graduated sanctions to help manage 
transgressions and external validation of those agreements). These 
principles are complimentary to the networking principles pro-
posed here, which are further informed by gamification principles, 
as well as the online community management strategies promoted 
by Jono Bacon (Bacon, 2012) (discussed below) to build networked 
communities that are engaging, enjoyable, participatory, and 
empowering.
Drawing upon this foundational thinking we have identified 
eight key principles for the gamification of blockchain eco-systems. 
This design guide is thus based on a synthesis of principles specified 
elsewhere which we review in more detail in the next sections, 
in combination with our own experiences designing playful teach-
ing and learning experiences, as well as studying networks with 
 co-operative mission statements.
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The literature discussed below focuses upon the concept of game 
design as the engine of co-operative motivation.
2.1.  Design strategies to promote purposeful 
playfulness
One of the most popular blockchain games to date has been 
Cryptokitties, which became a craze during the height of the bitcoin 
bubble in late 2017 (Jang et al., 2018). The game applied a playful 
context — breeding cute virtual cats — to peer-to-peer trading. 
Cryptokitties encouraged player collectors to breed and trade vir-
tual, meme-styled cats for a fee. Trading Cryptokitties became so 
popular that it inspired a record sale of over $US100,000 for just one 
cat (Cheng, 2017). Commentators have argued that the game 
became so popular precisely because of the appeal that such in-joke 
silliness has for today’s tongue in cheek, creative remix Internet 
 cultures (Dousos, 2018).
Against this backdrop, designing a playful and yet also purpose-
ful co-operative ecosystem for social enterprise initiatives poses chal-
lenges. Nevertheless, numerous social game design studies already 
exist that can support efforts to make co-operative platforms more 
playful and at the same time, play more social. For example, Belman 
and Flanagan’s (2010) framework for empathetic game design 
emphasizes the importance of establishing an empathetic stance 
upfront (such as the opening challenge to sing a lullaby to a virtual 
baby in order to stop them from crying out and being killed in the 
game Hush set during the Rwandan genocide of 1994) and by 
 continuing to support this stance with clear rules of engagement, 
that may also benefit from opportunities to walk in the other’s 
shoes through subjective task variance and vicarious emotional 
affects, supported by clear and ready remedies for any problems 
encountered.
As Deterding points out, the central feature of what he refers 
to as a humanist gamification approach is that both games and 
more informal, playful provocations are “deliberately designed 
(original emphasis) to afford positive experiences” (Deterding, 2018; 
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Jones, 2018). Here, the aim is not to simply impose formal game 
elements on social interaction and expect uniform results, but to 
explore how values normally associated with play, such as the sense 
of heightened motivation, free choice, joy, safety, active participa-
tion, enablement, open-collaboration, goal-orientation, and purpose 
(Deterding, 2012; Bozionelos and Bozionelos, 1999) can also char-
acterize blockchain eco-systems. This effort takes into account social 
practice and  cultural mores, as much as technologies.
As Deterding has pointed out, “scholars from Johan Huizinga 
(1955/1938) onwards have stressed, playing games is a voluntary 
activity” (Deterding, 2014, p. 308) and this voluntariness is a social 
consideration. Activities feel fun when they satisfy psychological 
needs for a sense of autonomy, relatedness, or competence (Deci and 
Ryan, 2012, in Deterding 309). When these needs are met, players 
are more likely to embrace hard challenges, or seek to make mean-
ingful choices.
Efforts to enable participatory agency (a sense of autonomy and 
meaningful influence) may appear to invite a smoke and mirrors 
design strategy — also borrowed from games — in order to create 
the sense of free choice despite the reality of limited options in a 
finite system. However, it is important to recognize that this is also 
a political strategy.
“The software is an actor, one that carries traces of the platform, 
of the plugins and hacks, of the administrator’s decisions … all are 
simultaneously manipulating me to behave in particular ways and 
enabling, empowering me to engage in specific behaviors, and sug-
gesting ways others should engage with and treat me.” (Owens, 
2014, 162–163).
After analyzing 28 different books devoted to the design and 
development of online communities, digital archive researcher 
Trevor Owens concluded that all but one promoted techniques to 
control users like they were commodities (Owens, 2014, p. 105). 
The notable alternative, according to Owens, was Jono Bacon’s 
2009 book The Art of Community: Building The New Age of 
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Participation. As the community manager for Ubuntu (an open 
source Linux operating system), Bacon focused on how a range of 
open source projects support such a collaborative effort and his lan-
guage was “fundamentally different from that of just about all the 
other contemporary Web books” (Owens, 2014; Stern and Seifert, 
2016). Bacon was still seeking to generate a community response, 
but his stance was collaborative. Instead of speaking of users, he 
refers to community members as volunteers. Rather than designing 
for behavior modification, Bacon talks in terms of designing tools to 
support the work of the group. He also used the word enable repeat-
edly, defining that as his role; to enable the community members to 
achieve their goals and also work with others to achieve a collective 
vision (Owens, 2014).
Deterding (NESTA, 2014) similarly emphasizes the role that 
gaming communities play, in partnership with designers, to create 
and maintain the sort of supportive and trusting environment that 
can offset the risks of gamified contexts, such as self-focused system 
gaming (working the system for self-benefit) and the sensitive line 
that distinguishes appropriate from inappropriate social play.
2.2.  Design strategies to promote co-operation
Game interactions are inscribed by the rules that delineate a game as 
either competitive, or co-operative (Zagal et al., 2006). Competitive 
games require players to directly oppose each other in a test of skill, 
or luck. Co-operative games instead provide opportunities to achieve 
a mutual win–win result. They don’t necessarily guarantee equal 
results, but they do encourage strategic alliances. Examples include 
alternate reality games which pose complex problems that are too 
big for any one individual to solve as a way to force social collabora-
tion. The challenge for participants to gather clues strewn in differ-
ent locations around the world is an example of this approach. All 
the participants must work together as a team to achieve the end 
goal. Other co-operative play structures include theatre games, 
which guide social improvization practice through a system of inter-
personal rules, such as the popular rule to respond openly to partner 
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suggestions with the motto “Yes and …” rather than block them 
with phrases like “Yes, but ….”
Strategies to help promote co-operation in multi-player virtual 
game worlds may also be helpful references for blockchain eco- 
system designers. Such strategies include designed role-play interde-
pendencies (e.g. warrior and healer) and the provision of a variety of 
player roles to satisfy different motivations (Bartle, 2004). In order 
to give participants a place to come together and form these alli-
ances, it is also important to consider the strategic architecture of a 
variety of social spaces like meeting rooms, or group calls. These 
spaces are most likely to be inviting when they are also supported by 
the provision of a rich variety of interaction mechanics like text, 
audio and visual gesture/movement, supplemented by ready rewards 
for interaction like reward claps for popular, or valuable social input 
(Ducheneaut et al., 2007; Ducheneaut et al., 2004).
Complimenting these strategies, it appears to be helpful if players 
can track their collective enterprise and social interactions over time, 
in order to witness and reinforce that they are gaining something 
from the experience. Similarly, the provision of different types of 
experiences and rewards designed for different stages and aspects of 
that journey can also help to create a sense of social enrichment over 
time, for example by allowing the occasional competitive encounter 
between groups (Rapp, 2017).
Ideally, the real-world relevance (impact/meaning) of digital 
interactions to social communities will be apparent at all times so 
that participants are clearly positioned as essential and powerful 
agents in that impact (Gresalfi et al., 2009). In mixed realities, it is 
also helpful if virtual feedback privileges conviviality, rather than 
battle-noise (such as the provision of like buttons, and the omission 
of dislike buttons).
In order to create an evocative visual sense of social co-presence, 
it is generally preferable if the virtual interface between players 
enables spontaneous self-organization, so that participants can easily 
initiate and participate within like-minded special interest groups 
(Vogiazou and Eisenstadt, 2005). Even if participants are pseudony-
mous (by using an anonymous avatar, but also agreeing to ID-checks 
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within the system, for example), they can still be represented by 
avatars that emphasize points of similarity, rather than status differ-
ences (Belman and Flanagan, 2010). This can be achieved by the 
ready inclusion of personable profiles, and biographies (see the game 
Layoff (Flanagan, 2009)), or by alternatively limiting interactions to 
gestures rather than talk, to engage the imagination and also ensure 
that people from different language groups can share experiences 
together (see the experiential video game for two random collabora-
tors, Journey (Thatgamecompany, 2012)).
Supplementing these studies, there are also established design 
principles for co-operative board games (allow individual decisions, 
ensure those decisions have clear outcomes, craft a variety of 
strengths/responsibilities in team roles, and introduce tensions 
between individual and group utility) (Zagal et al., 2006); coopera-
tive learning (positive interdependence, individual accountability, 
face-to-face promotive interaction, social skills training, and group 
processing) (Johnson and Johnson, 1987) and effective group-
improvization (non-judgmental approach, physicalization, commit-
ment to sociality, experimentation, and audience participation, 
combined with direct, fresh, daily and spontaneous contact with the 
world at large) (Spolin, 1963).
3.  Eight Principles of Gamified Blockchain 
Eco-system Design
Drawing upon all of these sources, we have identified eight princi-
ples for designing playful and co-operative creative blockchain eco-
systems, outlined below. These synthesized principles are chosen for 
their ability to promote a sense of voluntary engagement, social 
innovation, and collaborative empowerment.
3.1.  Balance individual and group goals
Tensions between individual and team goals can increase the inten-
sity of interaction. As long as participants are not battling for scarce 
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resources, enabling the capacity for individual choice, comparative 
judgment, or even competitive action can highlight tensions between 
self-interest and common goals. If those decisions are properly 
informed, then the capacity to co-construct meaning essential to 
deeper co-operation is enhanced. Highlighting these tensions may 
require that the entire system is relatively transparent, so that partici-
pants have access to a helpful systemic overview.
3.1.1.  Example application of principle 1 to the  
speculative design of a digital data-sharing 
blockchain eco-system
This principle highlights the need to balance the collective intelli-
gence goals with individual privacy controls. Privacy considerations 
suggest that individual participants will need to be able to control 
over who has access to their personalized data. Yet at the same time, 
the goal to build a collective data bank is likely to be served by the 
provision of rewards that make co-operation a valuable and mean-
ingful choice for those participants who voluntarily share their data 
with others. Such rewards might include access to personal archival 
progress analytics, coaching and individual work records that auto-
matically update recruiter profiles.
3.2.  Encourage risk, as much as accountability
In order to progress co-operatively, all participants need to build 
their capacity through a process of relatively safe experimentation, 
balanced by real world accountability tools.
3.2.1.  Example application of principle 2 to the  
speculative design of a digital data-sharing 
blockchain eco-system
Once a collective digital production intelligence is gathered, this data 
can help to inform the analysis and evaluation of digital craft skills 
among member organizations. As part of this analysis it will be 
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helpful to witness the value of less productive, but more experimen-
tal periods, as well as identify the most efficient production methods 
over time. Structures to encourage experimentation alongside 
 productivity goals might include playful challenges, like design 
sprints which challenge members to produce a maximum/minimum 
amount of data in a short amount of time, or the challenge to swap 
and apply other people’s working methods. Such playful social chal-
lenges can be supplemented by regular feedback provision such as 
task completion boards which member organizations can choose to 
share, or not.
3.3.  Provide useful feedback
Personal and collective data tracking can take many forms. Designers 
need to work with a community to explore what sort of feedback is 
most helpful and the concerns that participants might have about 
that evaluation process. Reputation systems are part of this, but 
 digital data banks may also offer other forms of developmental 
feedback.
3.3.1.  Example application of principle 3 to the 
 speculative design of a digital data-sharing 
blockchain eco-system
The facility to track individual contributions (now possible in auto-
mated systems) can be informative and this information is helpful 
if it is also shared in a mutually respectful way. For example, it is 
also generally beneficial if that facility is contextualized by an inclu-
sive learning and teaching lens, so that players are able to reflect 
upon past decisions, or performance in a way that is constructive, 
as well as encouraging. This may require peer-to-peer evaluation 
and support networks separate to management review structures, 
as well as some degree of system transparency. Participants should 
also ideally be able to access all the relevant, legally available infor-
mation (bearing in mind privacy concerns) required to enable 
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meaningful evaluation and feedback mechanisms. Where this 
requires some form of automated data translation, the algorithmic 
evaluation process should also be flexible and as transparent as 
possible.
3.4.  Encourage collaboration through variety
When a variety of skills and contributions are valued, enabling com-
plimentary roles and responsibilities, as much as vulnerabilities, can 
encourage community spirit.
3.4.1.  Example application of principle 4 to the 
 speculative design of a digital data-sharing 
blockchain eco-system
Fundamentally, this is about ensuring that different subjectivities, 
contributions and strengths are not only valued, but also seen to be 
valued. To achieve this requires input into the local rules, or oppor-
tunities for engagement (which may include the chance to share, or 
swap experiences) and rewards structures of each group. In smaller 
co-operatives, it may be possible to enable all participants affected 
by the rules to modify the rules, but in larger networks that capacity 
instead focuses upon nested agencies which enable individuals to 
self-organize in groups using networking structures that can be per-
sonalized in a variety of ways, such as hierarchical or egalitarian, 
centralized or decentralized, according to changing needs.
3.5.  Foster social presence
Intragroup communication facilities are essential tools for collabora-
tion and will generally thrive from a variety of interaction styles, 
including text, audio-visuals, or gesture. Similarly, opportunities to 
perform as well as watch and/or control privacy boundaries are help-
ful. Rewards for these actions will ideally emphasize the benefits of 
social bonds, rather than broadcast aggression.
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3.5.1.  Example application of principle 5 to the 
 speculative design of a digital data-sharing 
blockchain eco-system
Larger, less resourced groups are less likely to be co-operative 
(Olson, 2009; Buchanan and Tullock, 1962). Where co-operatives 
do grow, it may therefore be more productive in the long term if they 
instead follow Mondragon’s lead and develop consortia of smaller 
special interest groups. The more communication tools that these 
groups can access, the better. Ideally there will be a mix of face to 
face, as well as more flexible and remote digital communication 
channels. Each group may need to experiment with their optimum 
communication methods, which are also likely to change over time, 
but independence and freedom, balanced by personable and social 
presence are essential aspects of a functioning co-operative culture 
that, like empathy and social justice priorities may need to be articu-
lated up front and also regularly reinforced.
3.6.  Make it clear why co-operation  
is the best choice
To avoid central dominance there needs to be a clear rationale for 
co-operation, such as the capacity to extend personal resources by 
sharing the potential yield and burdens of digital assets, or the 
 systematic privileging of team-work — supported by transparent 
management.
3.6.1.  Example application of principle 6 to the 
 speculative design of a digital data-sharing 
blockchain eco-system
An example of this principle in action might include the introduction 
of playful rewards for voluntary creative community enterprise 
hours (bearing in mind the ecological and financial costs of non-
fungible asset registration) to help manage the data-gathering and 
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sharing enterprise. These reward assets can include compounding 
procedural animations, or premium digital functions that trigger as 
the collection grows. This option was suggested in the SGSAH/
Creative Scotland 2018 Digital Design Futures Report (Patrickson, 
2018), which explored a range of targeted community interventions 
for creative culture development and mentorship schemes including 
volunteer rewards, group creative graduate co-operative release 
packs, and collective fundraising frameworks for purchase of 
 creative studio space.
3.7.  Create meaningful group goals
Players need to care about the co-operative goal, or outcome, which 
will ideally be uncertain, to motivate effort. When achieved, this 
outcome also needs to be satisfying.
3.7.1.  Example application of principle 7 to the 
 speculative design of a digital data-sharing 
blockchain eco-system
The value of a cross-sectoral digital production data-bank needs to 
be readily apparent to all member organizations. The supply of use-
ful and meaningful collective production intelligence needs to be 
updated regularly, interpreted clearly and also easily accessible for 
members. Access to any shared financial rewards that might accrue 
from the resale of this information also needs to be distributed back 
to members in a timely and transparent manner.
3.8.  Design a developmental process
Randomized challenges and a journey experience may be required to 
engage participant’s changing needs over time. For example, visual 
encouragement and personal response may be more important in the 
early stages of engagement, balanced by the chance for skill recogni-
tion and greater responsibility over time.
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3.8.1.  Example application of principle 8 to the 
 speculative design of a digital data-sharing 
blockchain eco-system
A variety of reward structures and participation, or membership 
options can be made available. For example, the degree of available 
digital production analytics may vary according to the level of con-
tribution. Opportunities to gain public recognition for creative digi-
tal skill, or perform mastery in the form of intrinsic knowhow, or 
skill certificates, or community creativity awards are also likely to 
help encourage continued involvement over time.
3.9.  The holistic application of these playful 
design principles for blockchain  
eco-systems
What these principles highlight is that in order to transform behav-
iors and ultimately cultural practice, playful and co-operative block-
chain eco-systems need to collaborate with their associated 
communities of practice; a point that is sometimes lost amidst the 
current enthusiasm for algorithmic governance (Roio and Jelincic, 
2017). As such, the optimal deployment of these design principles 
will vary across different social contexts.
Not every blockchain eco-system will seek to achieve social value 
transformation, but the opportunity to advance social value trans-
formation through digital value adjustment holds promise for those 
who choose to pursue such social change agendas. In order for that 
collective enterprise to generate networked, co-operative exchange 
cultures the social goals will need to be articulated clearly, however, 
and these eight principles applied holistically.
4.  Blockchain Platform Co-operative  
Design Challenges
For blockchain eco-systems to be successful, members will generally 
need to be consciously working together to develop the challenge 
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pathways and shared rewards that can open up as a result of their 
combined efforts.
In this final section, we explore the ways that these eight design 
principles respond to the social, cultural, economic, and cre-
ative challenges that can arise as part of this sort of co-operative 
enterprise.
4.1.  Limited consumer market
Why would consumers prefer blockchain ecosystem tokens over cash 
when cryptocurrency transactions are costly, slow to process, drain 
resources, and are technically confusing for the uninitiated? This is a 
fundamental design challenge that blockchain eco-system designers 
need to consider seriously before they even begin to apply the design 
principles outlined in this chapter.
4.2.  Resource use
Ironically, despite the appearance of co-operation, blockchain tech-
nologies in fact create consensus on the back of self-interest and 
competition. The first cryptocurrency, bitcoin, is still the most secure 
of all the cryptocurrencies due to a costly and energy consuming 
proof of work authentication process driven by the promise of finan-
cial reward. Those who compete to be the first to solve a complex, 
cryptographic puzzle in order to win the allotted bitcoin cash reward 
are called miners. New bitcoins are created in each new round of this 
puzzle, along with a new block of authenticated transactions to be 
added to the chain. Once the puzzle is solved, those problem-solving 
efforts act like a de facto time stamp that proves that these transac-
tions were recorded on this block, in this time period. The new block 
is given a unique cryptographic hash number ID, which includes the 
hash of the previous block, and in this way each block in the chain 
is authorized and linked to the previous block in turn. Those records 
are regarded as immutable, which means that once authorized those 
records are extremely difficult to change. Due to the limited number 
of the bitcoin pool, over time these cryptographic puzzles have 
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become harder and demand more computing power to solve. Thus, 
ironically, the bitcoin protocol also encourages centralization as 
miners band together to up their chances of computation success. In 
theory, the genius of this system is that it can co-ordinate a variety 
of different self-interests into a collective win–win eco-system. In 
practice, that win–win is still seriously compromised by access 
issues, as well as the alarming amount of electricity required to sus-
tain it, which reportedly exceeds the electrical footprint of a country 
the size of Ireland (Hern, 2017). In other words, while digital net-
works can successfully co-ordinate self-interest for mutual benefit, 
they are not by their nature public services and need to be designed 
accordingly in order to help manage their societal impact and also 
promote their public benefits.
Given the limits of current blockchain technologies we conclude 
that these two fundamental logistic concerns signal the need for 
alternative prototyping strategies beyond proof of work authentica-
tion technologies like bitcoin. Until the technology develops, alterna-
tive blockchain technologies are required that limit the amount of 
blockchain registration, so that it is a smaller, perhaps voluntary 
part of a wider digital exchange eco-system. Another option is to 
promote the faster, lighter impact of blockchain inspired distributed 
ledger technologies like Corda for data-sharing ventures (such as the 
hypothetical digital data-sharing initiative discussed in this chapter). 
These alternative networks do not need to employ proof of work 
authentication protocols because access to the pooled data is by per-
mission and only available on a need to know basis. This may be a 
more controlled and less transparent form of data-sharing, but it is 
also more sustainable, enabling the data-sharing social processes to 
be established and tested now while the blockchain technology to 
support it continues to develop.
4.3.  Token creativity
The extent to which digital token alt-currency rewards can trans-
form social value systems is still unclear, largely because social 
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values incorporate so much more than currency exchange. The open 
source movement, for example, began in collaborative technology 
development and grew into what has been described as a “genuine 
grass roots revolution” (DiBona, et al., 1999; Jones, 2018). It enacts 
the idea that culture, remix, creative commons, sharing networks 
and individuals acting together without copyright restrictions in 
place can outperform corporations. The American (and global) 
 gitcoin.co platform, has recently sought to reward the open source 
space, by providing a facility for paid open source ethereum develop-
ment projects. Rather than tokenize those efforts or raising funds via 
a speculative initial coin offering (ICO), the platform emphasizes 
freedom and choice — all projects are voluntary and participants can 
choose who they work with.
These efforts are sensitive because they can also introduce new 
tensions between the extrinsic (external) and intrinsic (inherent) 
value of historically unpaid work. Social values such as friendship 
and caring are not generally monetized, or even formalized. Freedom 
of choice is essential because otherwise token based exchange sys-
tems force quantification. The hope of decentralization enthusiasts is 
that along the way these newly quantified tokens will also help to 
create a more inclusive and self-sustaining society. The challenge is 
to ensure that Walter Benjamin’s warning about endless copies does 
not also apply to tokenization: “That which withers in the age of 
mechanical reproduction is the aura of the work of art” (Benjamin 
and Underwood, 1998).
As Malik and Butt (Malik and Butt, 2017) have shown in an 
extensive review of creativity and rewards literature, theories of 
motivation have been dominated by two overarching and contradic-
tory perspectives. The cognitive perspective argues that extrinsic 
rewards (outcome focused) detract from (process focused) intrinsic 
motivation. Whereas the behavioral perspective argues that external 
factors (such as rewards, threats, deadlines, and competition) can 
both motivate and enhance creative behavior. The cognitive view is 
backed up by numerous empirical studies spanning several decades, 
which suggest that such trivializing rewards signal incompetency and 
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undermine experimental attitudes. This effect is particularly marked 
in relation to performance-contingent metrics, which can be per-
ceived as controlling. Creative cultures are characterized by their 
tendency to value autonomy, free association, experimentation, aes-
thetic pleasure, and playfulness as a way of working. They also need 
to embrace risk in order to invent, so while efficiency targets might 
inspire productivity improvements creativity is likely to drop off. 
In other words, extrinsic motivations can focus upon utility solu-
tions, while internal motivations are more likely to inspire novelty 
solutions. In particular, studies show that creative behaviors are 
challenged by tangible rewards, like financial bonuses.
“If managers operate on the simplistic “scientific management” 
notion that extrinsic motivation is always necessary and always 
positive, they can wander into a hopeless quagmire. It is extremely 
difficult to establish extrinsic reward systems that elicit exactly the 
behaviors that are desired; these systems are almost always 
flawed.” (Amabile, 1997; 9).
However, the situation is not entirely clear-cut. Intangible 
rewards that include task related information and support a sense of 
self-efficacy like positive feedback and public appreciation have been 
shown to enhance intrinsic motivation. Furthermore, when perfor-
mance efficiency and productivity metrics are exchanged for express 
creativity metrics and expected innovation evaluations they do foster 
creative behavior. According to these results creativity is not simply 
a skill, but also a decision or attitude (Sternberg, 2006). From that 
perspective, any factor which supports people in their efforts to 
make that choice (financial or otherwise) by setting creative goals or 
offering meaningful feedback and status rewards also supports cre-
ative behavior, with one proviso. These rewards only work as long 
as participants also have a strong sense of creative self-efficacy, 
which refers to “the belief (that) one has the ability to produce cre-
ative outcomes” (Tierney and Farmer, 2002, p. 1138). Those who 
doubt their own abilities are more likely to be motivated by the 
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chance to experiment, or play for its own sake, free of outcome 
expectations which can then slowly be introduced over time. 
Similarly, whereas intrinsic rewards foster engagement, extrinsic 
rewards may be important to help people pass through tough 
hurdles.
This suggests that any effort to tokenize creative contribution 
needs to be openly contextualized by the philosophical goal of recon-
figuring social value exchange. Rutherford and Nissen’s mission to 
consult with local communities and develop a feminist cryptocur-
rency is a good example of this sort of conscious, upfront approach. 
In terms of the design principles articulated here, this includes the 
need to encourage risk, as much as accountability and create mean-
ingful group goals, as well as balance individual and group goals and 
also foster a sense of social presence.
Efforts to monetize the value of what are often underpaid, but 
priceless creative commons are likely to be rejected unless they are 
designed in a way to emphasize intrinsic motivations. To support 
this effort it might also be helpful if tokens are designed to afford 
agency (such as votes, or information access and training, rather 
than money) and are simultaneously tied to sympathetic values like 
creativity, sustainability, sharing, and inclusion. In terms of our 
design principles, this emphasizes the importance of providing useful 
feedback, as well as the value of a developmental process and the 
importance of variety alongside clear rewards for co-operation, such 
as social presence, cultural enrichment, and meaningful group goals.
4.4.  Governance
Automated consensus systems that enable what are called “trustless 
transactions” (because participants don’t need to trust those involved 
in order to be confident that the transaction is as recorded on the 
digital ledger) enact the idea that code is law (Lessig, 1999). This 
metaphor refers to the prospect that code can effectively enforce 
itself by enacting pre-agreed events without human interference, or 
intervention. Given the propensity for fraud and exploitation in 
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current day markets, the idea of a completely automated manage-
ment structure that is strongly resistant to corruption, known as a 
Digital Autonomous Organization or DAO has captured the imagi-
nation of alternative economy enthusiasts (Roio and Jelincic, 2017). 
Nevertheless, just as traditional legal and policing systems have gen-
erally evolved for a reason, so too complex disputes inevitably tend 
to arise in most collective endeavors. For this reason, we argue that 
automated blockchain eco-systems are more likely to succeed when 
they collaborate closely with existing communities and provide cau-
tionary structures for human intervention when required.
Social value transformation efforts within Scotland’s creative 
communities are complex. At present, for example, there are grow-
ing tensions between the drive to grow the creative industries, versus 
the concern that these industries are being increasingly impoverished 
by freelance labor conditions. As a result of the rise of what has been 
called the gig economy (De Stefano, 2015), many creative practitio-
ners are now facing a potential future creative career without a mini-
mum wage, sickness leave, or retirement plan (McRobbie, 2018). 
Alternative solutions to income precarity are required. Innovations 
such as Patreon, crowdfunding, and IP stakeholder sales can help to 
support creative lifestyle choices which is why Deci and Ryan (1985) 
proposed that rather than focus upon an extrinsic–intrinsic dichot-
omy it is ultimately more useful to consider whether the participa-
tory motivation is autonomous or controlled. At the same time, 
however, whereas crowdfunding can provide sponsorship for those 
with an established public profile, not all creative practitioners have 
that sort of social influence. Indeed, a lack of public profile may 
reflect the desire for autonomy. Equal access to secure practitioner 
income is an ongoing concern.
Financial ownership, mutual responsibility, and self-autonomy 
are hallmarks of the successful Mondragon collective in Spain. 
Mondragon was pioneered in the Basque region in 1956 by a 
Catholic Priest Don José Maria Arizmendi-Arrieta and a small group 
of engineering graduates. It has since grown to become a large con-
sortium of different enterprises that together rank as Spain’s tenth 
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largest company with over 70,000 employees. This diverse enterprise 
is profit oriented, but united by a deep sense of social justice, partici-
pation, and solidarity. Their 10 basic Co-operative Principles include 
Open Admission, Democratic Organization, the Sovereignty of 
Labor, Instrumental and Subordinate Nature of Capital, Participatory 
Management, Payment Solidarity, Inter-co-operation, Social 
Transformation, Universality, and Education. These principles part-
ner four corporate values: co-operation (acting as owners), participa-
tion (in a commitment to management), social responsibility (by 
means of the redistribution of wealth based on solidarity), and inno-
vation (the pursuit of constant renewal) (Hira and Reilly, 2017). 
As a worker owned organization Mondragon does not allow for 
unionization or strikes, which means that disputes are governed 
internally (Latinne, 2014). Ownership in this context might seem 
like a numbers game, but the consortium is organized into autono-
mous sectoral divisions.
These concerns speak to foundational playful design principles 
such as voluntary engagement and the sense of participatory agency. 
In terms of the design principles articulated here this concern empha-
sizes the importance of fostering social presence, and encouraging 
risk as much as accountability, while fostering meaningful group 
goals, balancing individual and group goals and ensuring that 
 co-operation is clearly the best choice for all those involved.
A direct copy of the Mondragon system is unlikely in the context 
of Scottish collectives united by their love of creativity, rather than a 
religious fervor. Nevertheless, creativity is a passionate value and so 
the prospect of using blockchain technologies to create a third space 
where creatives, local businesses and communities can co-operate 
more confidently may deserve further consideration.
4.5.  Equity
Putnam defines social capital as ‘‘connections among individuals — 
social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthi-
ness that arise from them’’ (Putnam, 2000; McGonigal, 2011). 
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This definition has become emblematic of the idea that connectivity 
can generate creativity and abundance of its own accord, particu-
larly in the social media era. While blockchain technologies can be 
tools for extended social capital formation, equity is still an impor-
tant consideration for blockchain co-operatives. As DeFillippis 
(2001) points out, when social networking capacity is automatically 
conflated with the ability to generate social capital, it is also more 
likely that those networks unable to generate capital are rendered 
invisible:
“We need to create social networks that allow individuals to realize 
capital, while simultaneously allowing these networks to realize the 
power needed to attract and control that capital (for the benefit of 
those in the networks)…. Only in doing this can individual gains 
and interests be assumed to be synonymous with group gains and 
interests.” (DeFilippis, 2001).
As this concern highlights, blockchain eco-systems are more 
likely to be equitable when they encourage variety and accommodate 
designed interdependencies so that individual and group goals are 
balanced and all collaborative contributions are publicly accounted 
for, valued and rewarded. As part of this, we emphasize the impor-
tance of an inclusive teaching and learning lens to encourage experi-
mentation and developmental support, as much as reward mastery.
5.  Conclusion
This manifesto explored what game design theory offers for creative 
blockchain eco-system design efforts. As we have discussed, consen-
sus data-sharing technologies can automate peer-to-peer, digital 
value exchange in useful ways. In turn, this capacity can help to 
streamline efforts to achieve social value transformation through 
networked, collective actions. The ability to collect, collate, and ana-
lyze cross-sectoral digital production histories, for example, a hypo-
thetical community enterprise discussed in this chapter is dependent 
b3754_Ch16.indd   456 04-12-2019   06:40:58 PM
b3754  Managing Digital Open Innovation9x6 1st Reading





































upon technologies that can securely store, process, translate, and 
share that information, but in order to become a useful eco-system, 
this sort of collaborative initiative must first achieve a significant 
level of social practice or community engagement. In other words, 
the blockchain eco-system is only useful when enough people partici-
pate to achieve that purpose. The more people who are involved, the 
more useful that resource becomes. Thus, it is essential that auto-
mated networking systems such as this create a social exchange sys-
tem that is as personally empowering, socially engaging and 
culturally enriching as possible. We have argued that this is more 
likely when designers employ a gamified design approach in partner-
ship with existing networking structures.
While automated transactions are helpful, they are not necessar-
ily adequate controls to ensure the success of creative collective 
enterprise initiatives. Whereas identity verification and peer review 
reputation systems can promote social accountability, these systems 
can still reinforce historic social assumptions such as might is right, 
the winner takes it all, or you can’t trust anybody to name just a few. 
In order to develop a more co-operative and open creative culture 
eco-system it is helpful if more integral drivers are in place to moti-
vate voluntary engagement, contribution, playful innovation, and 
community enrichment. This is the sort of social practice that can 
help creative communities to collaborate and thrive together.
Drawing upon existing co-operative game-design principles, along 
with proven strategies to help promote co-operative resource manage-
ment, open networking and online community development we have 
identified eight design principles for playful and co- operative block-
chain eco-systems. These eight principles include: (1) Balance individ-
ual and group goals, (2) Build structures that encourage risk, as much 
as accountability, (3) Provide useful feedback and evaluation, 
(4) Encourage collaboration through variety, (5) Foster social presence, 
(6) Make it clear why co-operation is the best choice, (7) Create mean-
ingful group goals, and (8) Design a developmental process. Applied 
holistically, these eight principles are useful strategies for creative 
blockchain  eco-system design and development.
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This manifesto calls for these potentially transformative design 
strategies to be applied to the design of future blockchain  eco- systems. 
By making social values more apparent and embedding opportuni-
ties for social play within collective endeavors, co- operative design 
principles for playful/gameful engagement provide a preliminary 
framework to help articulate and potentially transform creative, 
 co-operative blockchain eco-systems.
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